Identity, plain and patient.
Yubico, Ledger, and Trezor make great hardware. Auth0 and Clerk authenticate users into web apps. Turnip is the only identity layer designed for an operating system that holds real money — every elevation is hardware-bound, every capability is time-bound, every action chains back to a human DID.
Identity · Signers
Signer ring · 6 devices · CFO requesting elevation
| Type | Device | Bound principal | Enrolled | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Passkey | iCloud Keychain · MacBook Pro | did:oas:org:acme:cfo | 2025-11-04 | active |
| YubiKey 5C NFC | YK · sn 19284441 | did:oas:org:acme:cfo | 2024-09-12 | active |
| Ledger Nano X | Ledger · BTC + ETH path | did:oas:org:acme:ceo | 2025-02-21 | active |
| Trezor Safe 3 | Trezor · auditor seat | did:oas:org:acme:auditor | 2025-08-09 | active |
| Garden Apex | Built-in · this machine | did:oas:org:acme:ops/03 | 2026-01-14 | active |
| Cold paper | Vault recovery · Shamir 2-of-3 | guardians · 3 of 5 | 2025-03-04 | offline |
Capabilities are minted just-in-time, with a 6-check policy gate.
When an agent needs to act, it requests a capability scoped to one action with a TTL in minutes. Turnip verifies the delegation chain, requires a hardware step-up, and signs the Arsenal token. Revoking the parent capability instantly collapses every descendant token.
Capability mint · arsenal:act_ce7d… · cabbage.invoices.issue
- Delegation chain validCFO → basil → invoice scope · 2 hops
- Hardware step-upYubiKey 5C touched 4s ago
- Scope within delegaterequested ⊂ delegated · all paths covered
- TTL within max1h 30m ≤ delegate ttl 4h
- Spend cap within limit$50k ≤ delegate $50k
- Counterparty allowlistdownstream cap is per-call enforced
| Holder | Scope | TTL | Uses | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
agent:basil16:41:24 | cabbage.invoices.issue max $50k | 1h 12m | 1 / 50 | active |
agent:tomato16:38:11 | bean.journal.post | 3h 41m | 4 / 100 | active |
agent:thyme16:22:09 | kale.sweep.execute max $80k | 47m | 0 / 5 | active |
agent:sage-bot15:14:02 | sage.screen.run | 12m | 412 / ∞ | active |
agent:vine14:02:18 | vine.events.subscribe | — | — | expired |
agent:rosemary13:47:01 | branches.balance.fetch | — | 12 / 20 | revoked |
Identity built for money, not for marketing emails.
Auth0 and Clerk authenticate users. Turnip authorises capabilities.
| Capability | Auth0 | Clerk | Okta | Turnip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WebAuthn / passkey | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Hardware-bound step-up | — | — | MFA | ✓ scope + ttl |
| Capability tokens (scoped) | — | — | — | ✓ Arsenal |
| Time-bound minting | session | session | session | ✓ seconds-scale |
| Lineage proofs for agents | — | — | — | ✓ |
| Shamir / guardian recovery | — | — | — | ✓ |
| Multi-device + threshold | — | — | — | ✓ FROST |
| Audit-chained auth events | logs only | logs only | ✓ | ✓ blake3 |
Agents mint capabilities. Humans authorise scopes.
An agent never holds a long-lived credential. It exchanges a delegated capability for a just-in-time Arsenal token bound to a specific action and scope — and the token dies in seconds.
tool turnip.session.elevate Request step-up for sensitive action tool turnip.capability.mint Mint a scoped Arsenal token tool turnip.capability.revoke Revoke active capability tool turnip.signer.enroll Enroll a hardware device resource ring://turnip/acme Active signer ring
POST /turnip/v1/sessions/elevate Step up session (WebAuthn / YubiKey) POST /turnip/v1/capabilities Mint scoped capability token DELETE /turnip/v1/capabilities/:idRevoke a live capability POST /turnip/v1/signers Enroll a hardware signer GET /turnip/v1/lineage/:id Resolve an action back to its human root
Authorization: Bearer arsenal:act_tn… X-Garden-Capability: turnip.capability.mint · scope=bean.period.close X-Garden-TTL: 90s · principal=did:oas:org:acme:cfo X-Garden-Hardware-Proof: yk:5C:19284441 (touched 2026-04-29T16:41:02Z)
Eight capabilities your auth stack can't.
- 01WebAuthn / passkey enrollment and step-up
- 02Hardware-bound session elevation (YubiKey, Ledger, Trezor, Apex)
- 03Time-bound, scope-bound Arsenal capability tokens
- 04Just-in-time capability minting (no long-lived secrets)
- 05Shamir-on-paper recovery ceremonies
- 06Multi-device pairing under one identity
- 07Lost-device revocation under threshold
- 08Audit-chained auth events sealed to Bean























